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Abstract  
This paper provides evidence on the role of non-base wage 
components as a channel for firms to adjust labour costs in the event 
of adverse shocks. It uses data from a firm-level survey for 25 
European countries that covers the period 2010–2013. We find that 
firms subject to nominal wage rigidities, which prevent them from 
adjusting base wages, are more likely to cut non-base wage 
components in order to adjust labour costs when needed. Firms thus 
use non-base wage components as a buffer to overcome base wage 
rigidity. We further show that while non-base wage components 
exhibit some degree of downward rigidity, they do so to a lesser 
extent than base wages. 
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Non-technical summary 
Micro-level data on wage variations and survey-based evidence on wage setting have revealed 
that even in the face of large negative shocks, not only are workers reluctant to accept cuts in 
their nominal wages, but also firms seem to be unwilling to carry out such cuts. This is 
referred to as downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR). The resistance to cutting wages – 
when economic conditions justify it – in favour of freezing them is of course a major 
impediment to labour cost adjustment. In the presence of DNWR, a positive rate of inflation 
is needed to facilitate the adjustment of relative wages. Hence, an inflation rate which is too 
low could lead, in the presence of DNWR, to long-term unemployment.  
However, the relevance of DNWR depends on whether firms have other margins besides base 
wages to adjust labour costs when needed. It is possible that rigidity has little effect on 
aggregate employment simply because firms have made adjustments that could be reflected in 
variables such as profits or productivity. Another possible explanation for the decorrelation 
between employment and DNWR is that firms may be able to achieve the necessary 
flexibility that is prevented by nominal wage rigidity by using more flexible pay components, 
such as performance-related bonuses, commissions and other benefits. Even though 
employees are less likely to oppose changes in these benefits than in their wages, from firms’ 
perspective they are also labour costs. That is why the key point when analysing DNWR is 
whether firms can flexibly adjust total compensation as a whole. It could be the case that the 
effective degree of DNWR turns out to be lower when one accounts for total compensation, 
leading to a smaller sacrifice ratio and reduced bending of the Phillips curve. 
This paper examines the issue of substitutability and complementarity between the base and 
non-base wage components raised in the literature. In particular, the paper assesses the role of 
non-base wage components as a channel of labour cost adjustment in firms facing adverse 
economic shocks during 2010–2013. It firstly focuses on the relationship between wage 
rigidities and the use of non-base wage component adjustment. It then analyses the 
differences in the responses of base wages and non-base wages to shocks.  
We use a unique dataset based on a survey of firms from 25 European Union countries 
undertaken between the end of 2014 and mid-2015 as part of the third wave of the Wage 
Dynamics Network – a Eurosystem research network created in 2006 and reactivated in 2013 
with the main purpose of assessing labour market adjustments in the period 2010–2013. 
The main results are the following. About 74% of firms covered in our sample paid bonuses 
and other performance-related benefits (non-base wage components) in 2013, with an average 
share of non-base wage components in the total wage bill in 2013 of around 7%. This is lower 
than in the pre-crisis period (11%). The smaller fraction of non-base wage components in the 
total wage bill may reflect the slower economic growth in 2013 relative to the pre-crisis 
period (2002–2007), but it is also suggestive of an increased role of these payments in firms’ 
labour cost flexibility, as reflected in a higher share of firms using non-base wages as part of 
their remuneration mechanisms. There is significant heterogeneity in the use of non-base 
wage reductions by sector and size for firms negatively affected by the economic conditions. 
A total of 13% of firms cut non-base wage components during 2010–2013, which is 
substantially larger than the percentage that cut base wages (5%). This is not surprising for the 
majority of countries given the prevalence of DNWR. 
  
 
4 
The results indicate that firms that are subject to nominal wage rigidities are more likely to cut 
non-base wages in order to adjust labour costs in the presence of shocks. Thus, bonuses and 
benefits played a role as shock absorbers during the period 2010–2013.  
While firms which experience a fall in demand are more likely to reduce both base wages and 
non-base wage components than those that do not suffer any shock, we find that the increase 
in the probability of reducing non-base wages is higher than that of reducing base wages. 
Similarly, other negative shocks consistently generate negative effects on wages, with non-
base wage components reacting more strongly than base wages to negative shocks. Our 
evidence also suggests that non-base wage components react more frequently in the case of 
negative shocks, and these reactions are stronger for non-base wage components than for base 
wages. 
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1. Introduction 
Micro-level data on wage variations and survey-based evidence on wage setting have revealed 
that even in the face of large negative shocks, not only are workers reluctant to accept cuts in 
their nominal wages, but also firms seem to be unwilling to carry out such cuts. In some 
countries, these are quite difficult to implement or even forbidden due to labour legislation. 
This is referred to as downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR). The restrictions on nominal 
wage cuts – when economic conditions justify them – in favour of wage freezes are of course 
a major impediment to labour cost adjustment. 
Besides legal constraints, several reasons have been given in the literature for workers’ and 
employers’ resistance to wage cuts. In addition to leading to lower standards of living for 
workers, such cuts may be considered unfair or demeaning by workers, with subsequent 
consequences for productivity. Stiglitz (1986) puts forward two main economic explanations 
for the presence of DNWR: the implicit contract theory, which exploits the role of wages as 
an insurance-providing mechanism against fluctuations in the cost of living, and the 
efficiency wage model, according to which wages are regarded as a productivity-enhancing 
device. Akerlof and Yellen (1990), Bewley (1999), Agell and Lundborg (2003) and Babecký 
et al. (2010), among others, confirm the importance of fairness and efficiency considerations 
in preventing wage cuts. 
The empirical evidence on the prevalence of DNWR is also vast and is based mainly on the 
analysis of changes in the wage growth distribution. In the U.S., clear signs of resistance to 
nominal wage cuts are found in studies such as Kahn (1997), Altonji and Devereux (2000) 
and Lebow et al. (2003). More recently, a comprehensive cross-country study conducted as 
part of the International Wage Flexibility Project has also revealed the existence of nominal 
wage rigidity in many European countries (Dickens et al., 2007). Babecký et al. (2010) 
provide survey-based evidence on downward wage rigidity and its determinants for EU 
countries during times of economic stability; Fabiani et al. (2010), Izquierdo et al. (2017) and 
Marotzke et al. (2017) find that DNWR was prevalent in EU countries even in the strongest 
phases of the recent crisis. 
The extent and implications of DNWR are one of the key long-standing debates in 
macroeconomics. The issue goes back to Tobin (1972), who argued that DNWR induces a 
long-term trade-off between inflation and unemployment. In the presence of DNWR, a 
positive rate of inflation is needed to facilitate the adjustment of relative wages, in particular 
in recessions. Hence, an inflation rate which is too low could lead, in the presence of DNWR, 
to long-term unemployment. 
Subsequent theoretical research has formalised Tobin’s argument in the context of the Phillips 
curve, which plots the average inflation rate against the average unemployment rate (Akerlof 
et al., 1996). From the perspective of monetary policy, in the presence of DNWR higher 
inflation could be a way to promote labour market efficiency by widening the range of real 
wage cuts accepted by workers, leading to a lower impact on unemployment. Indeed, in the 
face of negative shocks, employment adjustment is typically higher in the presence of 
nominal wage rigidity, particularly in low inflation regimes. This is one of the main reasons 
for having a positive inflation target. 
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More generally, the degree of wage rigidity determines, among other factors, the speed, nature 
and cost of adjustment in the presence of economic shocks. In particular, nominal wage 
rigidity may prevent the proper functioning of a multi-country monetary union with 
segmented labour markets such as the euro area, where there is significant cross-country 
heterogeneity in labour market features and performance. The macroeconomic consequences 
of different types of wage rigidities are analysed for the euro area countries in Fahr and Smets 
(2010). 
However, it is important to note that the macroeconomic effects of DNWR are not 
unambiguous. In fact, the relevance of DNWR depends on whether firms have other margins 
besides base wages to adjust labour costs when needed. It is possible that rigidity has little 
effect on aggregate employment simply because firms have made adjustments that could be 
reflected in variables such as profits or productivity. For instance, Nickell and Quintini (2003) 
find that despite some rigidity at zero nominal wage changes, the macroeconomic impact of 
such distortion is very modest. Gordon (1998) finds a positive correlation between the 
estimate of the time-varying NAIRU and inflation. One possible justification for this puzzle is 
that firms may be able to achieve the necessary flexibility that is prevented by nominal wage 
rigidity by using more flexible pay components, such as performance-related bonuses, 
commissions and other benefits. 
Bonuses play an important role in personnel economics as a performance incentive (Lazear 
and Oyer, 2007). Bonus payments are usually seen as a way of motivating employees to make 
more effort in the moral hazard problem on the agents’ side (Harris and Raviv, 1979; 
Hölmstrom, 1979). Admittedly, efficiency wages can also address this problem, but they do 
so in a less efficient way if a worker’s productivity is observable to some extent (Maestri, 
2012). Bonus payments outperform fixed wage contracts and piece rates in multitask jobs 
when only some task results can be monitored (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Fehr and 
Schmidt, 2004). The signalling effect of bonuses is also important in giving credible feedback 
to junior staff and preventing the best workers from looking for outside options (Fuchs, 2015). 
However, the application of bonuses can in some situations also lead to adverse effects on 
motivation (Klor et al., 2014; Nafziger, 2011). Thus, there is no universal and optimal method 
of remuneration and different theories explain only some aspects of the various methods used 
by firms (Brown, 1990; Hasnain et al., 2014).  
Most firms use a combination of different remuneration methods and motivation, so despite 
the fact that base or bargained wages typically display features of downward rigidity, it is 
possible that firms are able to vary other forms of remuneration – which may be less 
important or less visible to workers than base wages – to achieve desired adjustments in total 
labour costs. In many firms, particularly larger ones, performance-related benefits such as 
bonuses and commissions account for a large and growing share of total compensation. Even 
though employees are less likely to oppose changes in these benefits than in their wages, from 
the firms’ perspective they are also labour costs. That is why a key point when analysing 
DNWR is whether firms can flexibly adjust total compensation as a whole. It could be the 
case that the effective degree of DNWR turns out to be lower when one accounts for total 
compensation, leading to a smaller sacrifice ratio and reduced bending of the Phillips curve. 
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There is evidence suggesting that the effects of nominal base wage rigidity are at least partly 
overcome in this way. For instance, Lebow et al. (1999) measure the extent of DNWR using 
the microdata underlying the BLS employment cost index. They show that the number of 
nominal wage cuts is around one half of what would happen in the absence of this rigidity, but 
firms are able to mitigate at least a part of this rigidity by changing benefits: total 
compensation displays about one-third less rigidity than do wages alone. Dwyer and Leong 
(2003) show that broad measures of earnings also display downward rigidity, but to a lesser 
extent than wages. Bewley (1999), who interviewed the managers of companies in the U.S., 
found that bonuses were frequently used as a way of flexibly reducing expenses when firms 
were most in need of money. However, he also found that this strategy, similarly to base wage 
cuts, was connected with some disadvantages: damage to morale and productivity, and 
increased turnover of better workers. This is also in line with the earlier similar survey 
findings of Campbell and Kamlani (1997). 
On the other hand, the decision to extensively use non-base wage components can be seen as 
a wage cushion strategy – keeping a difference between the contractual and actual wage. In 
many countries, this strategy (margin) is frequently used to offset collective bargaining, 
granting firms the possibility of setting wage changes below those negotiated under collective 
agreements while keeping wages above the bargained floors (Cardoso and Portugal, 2005). In 
Germany, Jung and Schnabel (2011) found evidence that firms bound by multi-firm 
agreements paid higher wage premiums on average in order to overcome the restrictions 
imposed by the rather centralised bargaining system. 
The evidence of the relationship between changes in wage components and other channels of 
labour cost adjustment has been based mainly on detailed surveys addressed to firms’ 
managers. Non-base wage components seem to be considered by managers as important in the 
case of serious macroeconomic shocks. Babecký et al. (2012) examine the importance and 
determinants of a variety of strategies that firms might use to cut labour costs, particularly 
when base wages are rigid. They show that firms subject to nominal wage rigidity are much 
more likely to use these strategies, suggesting the presence of some degree of substitutability 
between base wage flexibility and the flexibility of other labour cost components. Messina et 
al. (2010) show that moderate or high use of non-base wage components in firms negatively 
influences DNWR, but “the complementarity between flexibility in base wages and flexible 
pay components casts serious doubts on the notion that rigidity in base wages might be 
circumvented using bonuses and other flexible components of pay”. Dias et al. (2013) provide 
evidence that in the face of negative shocks, the availability of alternative labour cost margins 
is likely to reduce the detrimental effect on employment that results from the presence of 
DNWR. There is also evidence that non-base wage components were frequently adjusted 
during the first period of the economic crisis in 2008–2009 (see ECB, 2009, and Fabiani et 
al., 2015). In fact, in some countries it appears to have been the only channel for wage 
adjustment in reaction to shocks. 
In this paper, we want to shed light on the issue of substitutability and complementarity 
between base and non-base wage components raised in the literature described above. In 
particular, the paper examines the role of non-base wage components as a channel of labour 
cost adjustment in firms facing adverse economic shocks during 2010–2013. It firstly focuses 
on the relationship between wage rigidities and the use of non-base wage component 
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adjustment.9 It then analyses the differences in the responses of base wages and non-base 
wages to shocks.  
We use a unique dataset based on a survey of firms from 25 European Union countries 
undertaken between the end of 2014 and mid-2015 as part of the third wave of the Wage 
Dynamics Network – a Eurosystem research network created in 2006 and reactivated in 2013 
with the main purpose of assessing labour market adjustments in the period 2010–2013. 
Our results reveal that bonuses and other performance-related benefits (non-base wage 
components) were an important adjustment mechanism for firms in the period 2011–2013. 
About 75% of the firms used this margin to reduce labour costs in 2013. The reported average 
share of non-base wage components is 7%, which is somewhat lower than the figure obtained 
for 2007 in the context of a similar survey. However, these are average shares and the degree 
of country and sector heterogeneity is considerable. The share of non-base wages in the total 
wage bill is higher in Portugal (25%) and lower in Luxembourg and Ireland (4% in both 
cases). It is also much higher in financial intermediation and lower in construction. There is 
significant heterogeneity in the use of non-base wage reductions by sector and size for firms 
negatively affected by the economic conditions. The percentage of firms that cut non-base 
wage components during 2010–2013 (13%) is substantially larger than the percentage that cut 
base wages (5%). This is not surprising for the majority of countries given the prevalence of 
downward nominal wage rigidity. 
The results also indicate that non-base wage components played a role as shock absorbers 
during the period 2010–2013. Firms that are subject to nominal wage rigidities are more 
likely to cut non-base wages in order to adjust labour costs. Shocks are associated with an 
increased reduction of non-base wage components as a means to adjust costs.  
While firms which experience a fall in demand are more likely to reduce both base wages and 
non-base wage components than those that do not suffer any shock, we find that the increase 
in the probability of reducing non-base wages is higher than that of reducing base wages. 
Similarly, other negative shocks consistently generate negative effects on wages, with non-
base wage components reacting more strongly than base wages to negative shocks. Our 
evidence also suggests that non-base wage components react more frequently in the case of 
negative shocks, and these reactions are stronger for non-base wage components than for base 
wages.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the data and the main 
stylised facts; Section 3 examines the relationship between non-base wage component 
adjustment and (base) wage rigidities; Section 4 looks in detail at base wage and non-base 
wage component adjustment in the presence of various combinations of shocks. The last 
section concludes. 
 
                                                          
 
9 Our focus is on the role played by wage components. Firms have other margins to make changes in their non-
wage labour costs, such as changes in overtime work or shifts policy. These margins are not considered in the 
paper. 
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2. Data and stylised facts  
2.1  The WDN3 Survey  
The data used in this paper were collected in the third wave of the Wage Dynamics Network 
survey (WDN3) coordinated by the European Central Bank.10 The survey was carried out 
between 2014 and the beginning of 2015 by 25 EU national central banks11 based on a 
harmonised questionnaire referring to the period 2010–2013. The WDN3 survey provided a 
unique cross-country dataset of labour market adjustment practices and wage and price setting 
mechanisms of firms with exceptional value in terms of both geographical and sectoral 
coverage. The data allow recent labour market adjustments to different shocks, such as change 
in demand, customers’ ability to pay and credit availability, to be assessed.  
Although the national surveys were organised and carried out by each national central bank 
separately, the questionnaire and the target population of firms were very similar across 
countries. A “core questionnaire” was developed in a coordinated fashion within the WDN. 
To further harmonise the findings across countries, we restrict our sample to firms employing 
more than five employees and operating in manufacturing, electricity and gas, construction 
and services (trade, market services and financial intermediation). 
In the WDN3 survey, firms were asked questions pertaining to the different margins of labour 
cost adjustment, including a reduction of employees, both permanent and temporary, base 
wage freezes, changes in the non-base wage components and cuts in the number of hours 
worked. Using these answers together with information on firms’ size, sector, institutional 
background and shocks gives us an opportunity to assess the effect of shocks on labour cost 
adjustment. 
As regards the components of labour costs, firms were asked the following question: “Please 
indicate how each one of the components of labour costs listed below has changed during 
2010–2013. Please choose ONE option for each line”. The list included the following options: 
1) Base wages or piece work rates;  
2) Non-base wage components (bonuses, fringe benefits, etc.); 
3) Number of permanent employees; 
4) Number of temporary/fixed-term employees; 
6) Working hours per employee; 
7) Other components (please specify). 
 
Firms participating in the survey were required to report for each option listed above whether 
they observed: (a) Strong decrease; (b) Moderate decrease; (c) Unchanged; (d) Moderate 
increase; or (e) Strong increase. In the analysis below, we classify a firm as having cut the 
corresponding component of labour costs if the answer was strong or moderate decrease. 
                                                          
 
10 This was a follow-up to the two previous WDN survey waves carried out in 2007 (WDN1, which covered the 
period 2002–2007) and 2009 (WDN2, which covered the period 2008–2009) 
11 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
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The survey also provides relevant information on the nature of the shocks faced by firms 
during the period 2010–2013. For the purposes of this paper, we consider shocks to: 
i)  Level of demand for products/services;  
ii)  Access to external financing through the usual financial channels; 
ii)  Customers’ ability to pay and meet contractual terms.  
Firms were required to report for each option whether they observed: (a) Strong decrease; 
(b) Moderate decrease; (c) No change; (d) Moderate increase; or (e) Strong increase. We use 
this question to identify how firms were affected by different shocks. For instance, we use 
changes in the level of demand (both moderate and strong) to identify firms that were hit by 
demand shocks and changes in access to external financing (both moderate and strong) to 
detect firms that were hit by credit shocks. Of course, these shocks could be positive if firms 
reported an increase, negative if firms reported a decrease or non-existent if firms reported no 
change in activity. 
We use a question on the use of base wage freezes in the given year (a yes/no answer) to 
construct the DNWR measure at the firm level. We regard firms that froze base wages during 
2010–2013 as confronting DNWR. 
2.2 Stylised facts 
About 74% of the firms covered in our sample paid bonuses and other performance-related 
benefits (non-base wage components) in 2013 (see Table 1). There is some cross-country 
heterogeneity, ranging from more than 90% of firms in Slovakia and Portugal to less than 
55% in Luxembourg, Ireland and Cyprus (see Table A1 in the Appendix). 
The average share of non-base wage components in the total wage bill in 2013 was around 
7% when calculated by averaging over all the firms sampled and 9.5% when calculated only 
across companies that pay non-base wages. Underlying this average there is large cross- 
country heterogeneity. While the share of non-base wage components in the total bill in 2013 
is 25% on average in Portugal, it is about 4% in Luxembourg and Ireland. When compared 
with the pre-crisis period, the average share of non-base wage components in the total wage 
bill of the firms sampled in 2007 was 11.3%, falling to 7.4% in 2013 for the subset of 
countries that participated in the WDN1 survey and 6.9% for the 25 WDN3 countries12 (see 
Table A1). The smaller fraction of non-base wage components in the total wage bill in 2013 
may reflect the slower economic growth in 2013 relative to the pre-crisis period (2002–2007), 
but it is also suggestive of an increased role of non-base wage cuts as a means of adjusting the 
wage bill during the crisis, in line with the higher share of companies paying bonuses and 
other performance-related benefits in 2013 (75%) compared to 2007 (72%).  
Larger firms are more likely to use non-base wage components (85% of firms with more than 
200 employees vs. 55% of firms with 5–19 employees; see Table 1). The smaller firms using 
non-base wages, on the other hand, dedicate a larger share of total pay to this wage 
                                                          
 
12 The WDN1 survey was the first wave of WDN and was carried out in 17 EU countries between the end of 
2007 and the first half of 2008. Conditional on firms paying non-base wages, the figures are 15.6% in 2007 and 
9.7% in 2013. 
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component (12%, compared to about 9% in firms of other sizes). The use of non-base wage 
components is also quite sector-specific. More than 92% of firms in financial intermediation 
sector use it and pay higher non-base wage shares compared to other sectors. At the other 
extreme, only 60% of firms in the construction sector pay a part of their wages as non-base 
wage components. 
Table 1: Non-base wage components by firm size and sector in 2013 
Size 
Firms using non-base 
wage components (%) 
Non-base wage in total 
pay, unconditional (%) 
Non-base wage in total 
pay, conditional (%) 
5–19 employees 54.9 6.8 12.4 
20–49 employees 64.1 6.1 9.5 
50–199 employees 73.7 6.3 8.5 
> 200 employees  84.9 7.7 9.1 
Sector    
Manufacturing 75.9 6.4 8.4 
Electricity, gas, water 82.9 8.3 10.0 
Construction 59.8 6.0 10.1 
Trade 75.0 8.1 10.8 
Business services 73.6 6.3 8.6 
Financial intermediation 92.7 14.9 16.0 
Total 74.2 6.9 9.4 
Source: WDN3, authors’ calculation. 
Note: The data are weighted to reflect overall employment and rescaled to exclude non-response.  
To understand the role that non-base wages played as a means of adjusting labour costs, we 
cannot ignore the incidence of different adverse shocks faced by firms during 2010–2013. The 
WDN results show that the share of firms affected by different shocks varies largely 
depending on the country and the nature of shock (Figure 1). As expected, countries that were 
more affected by the sovereign debt crisis (Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy) are also those 
where a larger share of firms reported facing negative shocks during 2010–2013. Importantly, 
firms in 14 out of the 25 countries viewed a decline in customers’ ability to pay as more 
severe than a decline in demand, though the two shocks are very much related. Unavailability 
of external finance (a credit constraint shock) was faced by a smaller share of firms in all 
countries.  
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Figure 1: Share of firms facing negative demand, customers’ ability to pay and credit 
shocks in 2010–2013 
 
Source: WDN3, authors’ calculation. 
Note: The data are weighted to reflect overall employment in the country and rescaled to exclude non-response. 
Combining the information on negative economic shocks perceived by firms with that on 
changes in non-base wage components provides some hints on whether firms use non-base 
wage components as a shock absorber (see Table 2). The percentage of firms having cut non-
base wages was larger in countries in which the percentage of firms experiencing either a 
strong or a moderate decline in any of the observed shocks was also larger. In the majority of 
countries, stronger negative shocks implied that more firms reduced non-base wage 
components. 
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Table 2: Percentage of firms having cut non-base wage components in 2010–2013 by 
country 
Country Unconditional  
Conditional on having faced 
negative shocks (either 
strong or moderate) 
at least one strong 
negative shock 
only strong 
negative shocks 
AT 6.1 6.1 9.0  
BE 2.8 2.9 3.1  
BG 21.1 34.1 42.9 44.1 
CY 52.2 63.4 64.7 52.4 
CZ 21.6 32.1 43.7 70.4 
DE 4.3 6.7 14.6 58.9 
EE 5.8 18.5 40.3  
ES 23.7 28.4 22.3 26.7 
FR 12.1 13.8 17.9 35.7 
GR 50.9 53.8 59.2 72.7 
HR 24.2 33.4 42.3 86.4 
HU 20.0 28.5 33.1 51.7 
IE 27.7 39.4 49.3 58.6 
IT 19.9 22.4 28.4 53.0 
LT 11.2 19.0 35.1 74.5 
LU 15.5 23.5 29.7  
LV 10.6 24.0 45.5 26.7 
MT 0.4 1.0 5.6  
NL 28.1 35.5 37.4 48.3 
PL 11.8 11.6 24.0 16.5 
PT 21.7 25.3 30.2 40.3 
RO 11.2 20.6 30.1 49.0 
SI 30.4 35.1 44.5 61.9 
SK 17.4 20.6 23.9 46.2 
UK 9.3 14.9 14.7   
Total 13.0 18.2 25.0 41.4 
Source: WDN3, authors’ calculation. 
Note: The shocks considered are change in demand, customers’ ability to pay and access to external finance. 
The data are weighted to reflect overall employment in the country and rescaled to exclude non-response 
 
Table 3 presents the percentage of firms adjusting non-base wages by sector and firm size. 
The percentage of firms that cut non-base wage components is larger in financial 
intermediation, in line with the larger prevalence of non-base wage components in this sector 
(see Table 1). This share is lower in other sectors, particularly the electricity and gas sector. 
The shares of firms having cut non-base wage components by firm size are more even. 
However, large firms more often use reductions in non-base wage components as shock 
absorbers. Firms facing negative shock use reductions of non-base wage components more 
frequently in all sectors and firm size categories. 
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Table 3: Percentage of firms having cut non-base wage components in 2010–2013 by 
sector and size 
Sector 
Unconditional 
Conditional on having faced 
negative shocks 
(either strong or 
moderate) 
at least one strong 
negative shock 
only strong 
negative shocks 
Manufacturing 10.7 16.1 24.0 40.1 
Electricity, gas 3.6 6.6 29.5 
 Construction 15.0 20.0 28.2 43.8 
Trade 14.8 20.5 23.6 41.2 
Business service 13.3 17.6 25.0 40.3 
Financial intermediation 18.2 31.4 37.8 64.6 
Size     
5–19 employees 12.7 16.3 22.9 39.6 
20–49 employees 11.9 16.7 25.7 38.6 
50–199 employees 12.0 16.6 23.6 36.5 
> 200 employees  14.1 20.7 27.1 48.5 
Total 13.0 18.2 25.0 41.4 
Source: WDN3, authors’ calculation. 
Note: As in Table 2 
The adjustment of non-base wage components is not the only labour cost adjustment channel 
potentially used by firms in response to negative shocks. In fact, previous studies find that 
firms use several adjustment channels simultaneously when reducing labour costs (Messina et 
al., 2010). Table 4 presents the sample conditional proportions of several adjustment margins, 
such as base and non-base wage components, hours and employment, both for all firms in the 
sample and for those firms that were affected by negative shocks in the three dimensions 
considered (demand, customers’ ability to pay and access to external financing). 
Regardless of the strength of the shocks, the proportion of firms that cut the number of 
employees is larger than the proportion of firms that cut hours or wages. A larger share of 
firms report base wage freezes compared to cuts in either base or non-base wage components. 
However, in the subsample of firms facing only strong negative shocks, the share of firms 
using base wage freezes or non-base wage cuts is similar.  
  
  
 
15 
 
Table 4: Sample conditional proportions of negative change in labour cost margins in 
2010–2013 (proportions calculated as weighted relative frequencies) 
  
Cut base 
wages 
Cut non-
base wages 
Cut number of 
employees 
Cut number 
of hours 
Freeze 
base wages 
P(.) 0.053 0.130 0.329 0.114 0.262 
  Having faced negative shocks (either strong or moderate) 
P(.) 0.075 0.182 0.423 0.162 0.296 
P(.|cut non-base wages) 0.260 1.000 0.745 0.270 0.471 
P(.|cut base wages) 1.000 0.631 0.784 0.293 0.508 
P(.|cut non-base and base wages) 1.000 1.000 0.862 0.331 0.580 
  Having faced at least one strong negative shock 
P(.) 0.108 0.250 0.552 0.226 0.365 
P(.|cut non-base wages) 0.319 1.000 0.783 0.313 0.491 
P(.|cut base wages) 1.000 0.739 0.854 0.352 0.548 
P(.|cut non-base and base wages) 1.000 1.000 0.879 0.389 0.604 
  Having faced only strong negative shocks 
P(.) 0.209 0.414 0.704 0.302 0.449 
P(.|cut non-base wages) 0.441 1.000 0.819 0.337 0.529 
P(.|cut base wages) 1.000 0.875 0.893 0.426 0.559 
P(.|cut non-base and base wages) 1.000 1.000 0.905 0.455 0.542 
Source: WDN3, authors’ calculation. 
Note: The shocks considered are change in demand, customers’ ability to pay and access to external finance. The 
measure of change in a firm’s (internal) number of employees combines permanent and temporary employees. 
The results are weighted to reflect overall employment in the country and rescaled to exclude non-response. 
In every country in our sample except Greece and, to a lesser extent, Cyprus (see Table A2), 
the proportion of firms that cut non-base wage components during 2010–2013 is larger than 
the proportion that cut base wages. This is not surprising and points to possible substitution 
between the two adjustment channels, in line with the findings of Babecký et al. (2012), 
Lebow et al. (1999) and Bewley (1999), among others. Substitution between base and non-
base wages is particularly relevant for firms in France, Portugal, Luxembourg and Spain, 
where it is harder to reduce base wages for permanent employment. In the Baltic countries 
(Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and Poland and Croatia, firms are more flexible in the choice 
of adjustment margin due to generally lower base wage rigidity.13 
Table 4 shows the proportions of firms using some labour cost-cutting margin both for all 
firms in the sample and for those firms that were negatively affected by shocks. As expected, 
the proportion of firms using any labour cost-cutting margin increases within the sample of 
firms that were negatively affected by at least one shock. For instance, the share of firms that 
                                                          
 
13 The de facto enforcement of wage adjustment restrictions is loose in these countries despite their high EPL 
scores. These conclusions are confirmed by a large survey of institutional features of wage bargaining (Du Caju 
et al., 2008). 
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cut the number of employees, either permanent or temporary, increases from 33% in the 
whole sample to 42% in the sample of firms facing shocks. Perhaps more interesting is that 
the proportion of firms cutting employment reaches 75% among firms that also cut non-base 
wages, 78% among those that also cut their base wages and 86% for those that cut both. 
These percentages are even higher if any of the shocks was deemed to be strong. This 
suggests that firms tend to use several available cost-cutting margins, the more so the more 
strongly they are hit by the crisis.  
 
3. Do firms use non-base wage components as a buffer to overcome base 
wage rigidity?  
Are firms subject to nominal base wage rigidity more likely to respond to shocks by cutting 
the non-base component of wages? Do firms thus use non-base wage components as a buffer 
to overcome base wage rigidity (DNWR)? Does the presence of unions affect firms’ decisions 
regarding non-base wages?  
Figure 2: Share of firms freezing wages in 2010–2013, % 
 
Source: WDN3, authors’ calculation. 
Note: The data are weighted to reflect overall employment in the country and rescaled to exclude non-response. 
In this section, we explore the decision to cut non-base wage components as a buffer to 
alleviate base wage rigidity. To construct a measure of DNWR, we use the information 
contained in the WDN3 survey about base wage freezes. The survey asked managers of firms 
directly if they ever froze wages during the period 2010–2013. Wage freezes indicate that 
base wage cuts were prevented from taking place due to DNWR, and more so in a downturn, 
when economic conditions are likely to necessitate a cut in base wages. Then, following 
Dickens et al. (2007) and Dias et al. (2015) (see also Nickell and Quintini, 2003), we regard 
firms that froze wages at any point during this period as facing nominal base wage rigidity. 
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We assume that in those firms, everyone whose base wages were frozen would have had a 
nominal wage cut in the absence of DNWR.14  
The ranking of the countries by the share of firms freezing base wages during 2010–2013 is 
mainly in line with the share of countries experiencing negative shocks (see Figures 1 and 2). 
The exception is the UK – it ranks the last by the share of firms experiencing negative shocks 
and at the same time has a relatively large share of firms freezing wages. Similarly, a large 
share of firms in Ireland report wage freezes despite a lower level of firms facing negative 
shocks on average. Another interesting observation is that in these countries, along with 
Cyprus, Slovakia, Lithuania and Latvia, the share of firms reporting wage freezes without 
facing negative shocks is substantial (between 10% and 30%, as indicated by the vertical lines 
in Figure 2). This could be related to firms using the opportunity to reduce labour costs by 
exploiting the low overall level of economic sentiment without actually facing negative 
shocks at the time. 
In order to identify the potential determinants of the probability of cutting non-base wage 
components and in particular its relationship with DNWR, we consider a number of firm 
characteristics, such as size or skill distribution, collective bargaining, bargaining coverage 
and labour cost share, together with our measure of DNWR, and control for the various types 
of shocks explained in the stylised facts section. The result of the probit estimations is 
summarised in Table 5, where the dependent variable takes the value of one if the firm cut 
non-base wage components over the period 2010–2013. We find that firms subject to nominal 
rigidity are more likely to cut non-base wage components, in line with the larger share of 
firms reducing various labour cost margins in the presence of DNWR (see Table A2). This 
result is robust to the choice of other control variables, including the type of shocks and the 
interaction terms between shocks and nominal wage rigidity (Table 5, column 3). 
Interestingly, while non-base wage cuts are correlated with shocks and with freezes of base 
wages, the effects do not stem from the interactions.15 
Regarding other determinants influencing the decision to adjust non-base wage components, it 
turns out that, as suggested by the descriptive analysis in Section 2, larger firms are more 
likely to use non-base wage components (Table A3). Similarly, firms with a higher labour 
cost share and a higher share of tenured workers, as well as firms in construction and financial 
intermediation, are more likely to adjust non-base wage components than firms in 
manufacturing.  
  
                                                          
 
14 Of course, some of these freezes could have been due to menu cost or might have been optimal responses to 
changing conditions.  
15 This may be driven by multicollinearity between the shocks and DNWR itself.  
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Table 5: Relationship between cuts in non-base wage components and base wage rigidity 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Base wage rigidity        
DNWR base wage freezes  0.117*** 0.086*** 0.084*** 
 
(0.010) (0.008) (0.016) 
Shocks    
Demand shock  0.109*** 0.114*** 
  (0.013) (0.015) 
Finance shock  0.058*** 0.062*** 
  (0.007) (0.008) 
Customers’ ability to pay shock  0.032*** 0.019** 
  (0.008) (0.009) 
Availability of supplies shock  0.028*** 0.033*** 
  (0.006) (0.008) 
DNWR * Shocks        
Base wage freezes & demand shock    -0.019 
   (0.021) 
Base wage freezes & customer pay shock    0.038*** 
   (0.012) 
Base wage freezes & credit shock    -0.014 
   (0.013) 
Base wage freezes & availability of supplies 
shock   -0.015* 
   (0.009) 
Observations 19,234 18,582 18,582 
Note: Marginal effects reported. Probit estimation. The dependent variable is equal 
to one if the firm reduces non-base wage components. Standard errors in 
parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The estimation is controlled for 
sectors, firm size, labour cost share, share of manual workers, workers’ tenure, 
multi-establishments and country fixed effects. See Table A3 in the Annex for the 
full set of results. 
 
Next, we explore the effect of unions on firms’ use of non-base wage components. Table A4 
shows that unionisation and the type of wage bargaining have no significant effects. 
Moreover, different combinations and interactions of variables, sectors and collective 
bargaining characteristics are not significant and do not affect the main results. Thus, 
substitutability between base and non-base wages to overcome DNWR is not limited by the 
presence of unions. In fact, collective wage bargaining and coverage do not appear relevant as 
regards the decision to cut non-base wage components. In addition, the higher likelihood of 
adjusting non-base wage components when DNWR is prevalent persists no matter what type 
of shocks the firm is facing. See Table A4 in the Annex. 
To sum up, at the margin, firms affected by DNWR are more likely to reduce non-base wage 
components than those not showing base wage rigidities. Hence, there is evidence of non-base 
wages being used as a buffer to overcome base wage rigidity. 
However, firms combine several adjustment channels when needed. The next section explores 
the relationship between base and non-base wage component adjustments more generally and 
compares their degree of downward rigidity. 
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4. Adjustment of base wages and non-base wage components to shocks 
In order to explore the relation between the adjustment of base wages and non-base wage 
components, we start by reporting the frequencies of different base wage and non-base wage 
reactions to changing economic conditions. Then we estimate their probabilities. 
 
4.1 Incidence of base wage and non-base wage component reductions 
We consider four possible combinations of base and non-base wage adjustment by firms in 
response to negative shocks: 
1. Reduce neither base nor non-base wage components (base = 0, flex = 0); 
2. Reduce only non-base wage components (base = 0, flex = 1); 
3. Reduce both base and non-base wage components (base = 1, flex = 1); 
4. Reduce only base wages (base = 1, flex = 0). 
We find that firms are reluctant to reduce wages and mostly choose the first option (Table 6). 
This is also the case when we consider various subsamples of firms which are hit by a fall in 
demand, a fall in demand or customers’ ability to pay, and additionally a fall in credit access. 
For all groups considered, the second most frequent option is to reduce solely the non-base 
wage component. It is chosen approximately three times more often than the joint reduction 
of base wages and non-base wage components. Base wage reductions without reducing non-
base wage components are rare. 
The option not to reduce wages is chosen by 82.6% of all firms. The fraction is lower for 
firms which experience a fall in demand (72.5%). The fraction of firms which reduce non-
base wage components only or which additionally reduce base wages increases substantially 
from 11.6% to 18.7% and from 3.7% to 6.1%. The fraction of firms which reduce base wages 
alone rises only from 2.0% to 2.7%. The evidence suggests that non-base wage components 
are more reactive in the case of negative shocks. 
 
Table 6: Incidence of wage reductions  
 Wage adjustment options (%)   
 (1) (2) (3) (4)   
 base = 0 base = 0 base = 1 base = 1 Total Obs. 
Subsample of firms flex = 0 flex = 1 flex = 1 flex = 0   
Total 82.6 11.6 3.7 2.0 100 18,503 
Decline in demand 72.5 18.7 6.1 2.7 100 8,416 
Decline in demand or in customers’ ability to pay 76.0 15.9 5.2 2.9 100 11,172 
Decline in demand or in customers’ ability to pay 
and credit restrictions 
75.4 16.3 5.7 2.6 100 8,995 
Source: WDN3, authors’ calculation. 
Note: The data are weighted to reflect overall employment. Estimation sample of Section 4.2. 
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4.2 Response of base wages and non-base wage components to changes in demand 
In order to compare the likelihood and determinants of changes in base and non-base wage 
components, we estimate ordered probit models, related through the error terms (Seemingly 
Unrelated Regressions – SUR). The underlying latent variable models are as follows: 
𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 = 𝑋 𝛽𝑏 +  𝑢𝑏 
𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥 = 𝑋 𝛽𝑓 +  𝑢𝑓 
where base and flex reflect the adjustment of base and non-base wages respectively (decrease, 
unchanged, increase), X are the firm’s characteristics and ub and uf are the related error terms. 
The firms’ characteristics include its structure, ownership, autonomy level, size, country and 
sector as well as the change in economic conditions. 
We find that firms which are hit by negative demand shocks are more likely to reduce base 
wages and non-base wage components compared to the reference category of unchanged 
demand (Table 7). However, the increase in the likelihood of wage reduction is stronger for 
non-base wage components than for the base wage. When facing positive demand shocks, 
firms increase both base wage and non-base wage components and they do so to the same 
extent, or, to be more precise, the increase in the likelihood is not significantly different. We 
find a stronger upward response of wages to an increase in demand than a downward response 
to a fall in demand for both base wages and non-base wage components. Further, a fall in 
demand significantly increases the probability that wages remain unchanged, while an 
increase in demand lowers the probability of unchanged wages. This asymmetry is evidence 
of downward rigidity (see Marotzke et al., 2017). The effect of a fall in demand on unchanged 
wages is larger for base wages than for non-base wage components. We conclude from the 
comparison of marginal effects that downward rigidity is stronger for base wages than for 
non-base wage components.16  
  
                                                          
 
16 We conducted z-tests to compare marginal effects. 
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Table 7: Base wage and non-base wage adjustment, SUR estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Base wages Base wages Base wages 
 Decrease Unchanged Increase 
Demand    
 Decrease 0.027*** 0.039*** -0.066*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.009) 
 Unchanged (reference) - - - 
 Increase -0.041*** -0.096*** 0.137*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.009) 
Finance shock 0.024*** 0.036*** -0.060*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) 
Customers’ ability to 
pay shock 
0.008*** 0.013*** -0.021*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) 
Availability of supplies 
shock 
0.009** 0.013** -0.022** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) 
 Non-base wages Non-base wages Non-base wages 
 Decrease Unchanged Increase 
Demand    
 Decrease 0.068*** 0.019*** -0.087*** 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.008) 
 Unchanged (reference) - - - 
 Increase -0.069*** -0.071*** 0.140*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) 
Finance shock 0.045*** 0.018*** -0.063*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) 
Customers’ ability to 
pay shock 
0.019*** 0.009*** -0.027*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) 
Availability of supplies 
shocks 
0.017*** 0.007*** -0.025*** 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.008) 
p-value 0.000   
Rho 0.6   
Observations 18,326   
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0. The results are 
obtained using Stata command cmp written by Roodman (2011). Details on the 
estimation of fully observed recursive mixed-process models with cmp are provided in 
Stata Journal 11(2): pp. 159–206. Control variables include structure, ownership, 
autonomy level, size and sector. Country and sector dummies are also included.  
 
4.3 Effect of various types of negative shocks 
Next, we explore the effect of various types of negative shocks on wage adjustment. We 
include the strength and persistency of the demand shock, which gives us five different 
categories of negative demand changes. 
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Table 8 (to be continued): Base wage and non-base wage adjustment, SUR estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Base wages Base wages Base wages 
 Decrease Unchanged Increase 
Demand    
 No decrease (reference) - - - 
 Moderate decrease 0.043*** 0.080*** -0.122*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) 
 Strong transitory decrease 0.072*** 0.113*** -0.185*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.027) 
 Strong partly persistent decrease 0.070*** 0.111*** -0.181*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.015) 
 Strong long-lasting decrease 0.081*** 0.121*** -0.202*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) 
Finance shock 0.021*** 0.033*** -0.054*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) 
Customers’ ability to pay shock 0.008*** 0.014*** -0.022*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) 
Availability of supplies shock 0.006* 0.010* -0.016* 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.009) 
    
 
The results in Table 8 show that all categories of the fall in demand exhibit consistent effects. 
Firms which are hit by a negative demand shock are more likely to reduce both base wages 
and non-base wage components. A strong fall in demand induces a stronger marginal effect 
than a moderate fall in demand. The largest marginal effect is in response to a strong, long-
lasting negative demand shock. The strength and persistence of a fall in demand does not 
affect the marginal effect of a fall in demand on the probability of unchanged non-base wages. 
However, the marginal effect of a fall in demand on the probability of base wages remaining 
unchanged is higher when the shock is strong, which might reflect stronger downward rigidity 
of base wages. We find that the marginal effect on the probability of reducing non-base wages 
is stronger than in the case of base wages (see the first column in Table 8). 
The other negative shocks (finance, customers and supplies) exhibit very consistent negative 
effects on wages. Non-base wage components react more strongly than base wages to 
negative shocks. Further, the marginal effect of all types of negative shocks on the probability 
of keeping base wages unchanged is larger than that on the probability of base wages being 
reduced, while it is the other way around for non-base wage components. This means that 
firms find it easier to reduce non-base wage components. 
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Table 8 (continued): Base wage and non-base wage adjustment, SUR estimates 
 Non-base 
wages 
Non-base 
wages 
Non-base 
wages 
 Decrease Unchanged Increase 
Demand    
 No decrease (reference) - - - 
 Moderate decrease 0.091*** 0.053*** -0.143*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) 
 Strong transitory decrease 0.135*** 0.056*** -0.190*** 
 (0.022) (0.003) (0.022) 
 Strong partly persistent decrease 0.164*** 0.052*** -0.217*** 
 (0.012) (0.003) (0.011) 
 Strong long-lasting decrease 0.178*** 0.050*** -0.228*** 
 (0.011) (0.003) (0.010) 
Finance shock 0.039*** 0.017*** -0.056*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) 
Customers’ ability to pay shock 0.019*** 0.010*** -0.029*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) 
Availability of supplies shock 0.014** 0.006** -0.020** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.008) 
p-value 0.000   
Rho 0.6   
Observations 18,187   
Note: As in Table 7.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Bonuses and other performance-related benefits declined considerably during 2010–2013 in 
comparison with the pre-crisis period. The average share of performance-related benefits in 
the total wage bill of the firms sampled in 2007 was 11.3%. The figure fell to 7.4% in 2013 
for the subset of countries that participated in the first WDN survey, while for the 25 
countries participating in the third WDN survey, the average was 6.9%. The smaller fraction 
of bonuses and benefits in the total wage bill may reflect the slower economic growth in 2013 
relative to the pre-crisis period (2002–2007), but it is also suggestive of an increased role of 
bonuses in firms’ labour cost flexibility, as reflected in a higher share of firms using non-base 
wages as part of their remuneration mechanisms. This paper explores the behaviour of non-
base wage components as a possible adjustment channel available to firms. 
We first find that firms facing DNWR are more likely to use bonuses and benefits to reduce 
labour costs. This finding confirms that in the presence of DNWR during the period 2010–
2013, non-base wage components acted as a buffer to overcome DNWR, which prevents 
firms from cutting base wages. Similar results were found for the period 2002–2007 with data 
from the first WDN survey. These results have implications for monetary policy. In particular, 
they suggest that the wage rigidity associated with the overall wage bill may be lower than 
base wage rigidity alone. Thus, the presence of non-base wage components helps achieve 
overall wage flexibility. In fact, the results indicate that bonuses and benefits played a role as 
shock absorbers during the period 2010–2013. In particular, demand and credit shocks are 
both associated with increased use of non-base wage components as a means to adjust costs. 
Moreover, regression analysis supports the view that the use of bonuses and benefits is not 
influenced by unionisation; cutting bonuses is thus likely to be a strategy developed outside 
  
 
24 
formal collective bargaining. Larger firms and firms in financial intermediation are among the 
most likely to adjust non-base wage components.  
Then, when comparing adjustment via base wages and non-base wage components, we find 
that firms which are hit by negative and persistent demand shocks are more likely to reduce 
wages, with the marginal downward effect on non-base wages being stronger than that on 
base wages. Other negative shocks (such as finance constraints, customers and supplies) 
exhibit very consistent negative effects on wages. Non-base wage components react more 
strongly than base wages to all the types of negative shocks analysed. To sum up, firms use 
non-base wage components as a buffer to overcome base wage rigidity.  
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Annex 
Table A1: Bonuses by country  
  WDN1 2007 WDN3 2013 
Country 
Companies 
using non-
base wage 
components 
(%) 
Non-base wage 
components in 
total pay, 
unconditional 
(%) 
Non-base 
wage 
components 
in total pay, 
conditional 
(%) 
Companies 
using non-
base wage 
components 
(%) 
Non-base wage 
components in 
total pay, 
unconditional 
(%) 
Non-base 
wage 
components 
in total pay, 
conditional  
(%) 
Austria 70.6 9.0 12.8 79.4 5.0 6.3 
Belgium 100.0 7.6 7.6 61.0 3.2 5.3 
Bulgaria - - - 55.8 5.2 9.4 
Cyprus - - - 54.2 4.2 7.7 
Czech Republic 99.1 20.6 20.8 84.1 10.1 12.0 
Germany - - - 72.9 5.2 7.2 
Estonia 78.4 14.0 17.9 79.6 12.9 16.3 
Spain 40.9 3.7 9.1 60.4 4.3 7.2 
France 69.1 11.3 16.4 79.2 5.6 7.1 
Greece - - - 59.6 4.9 8.2 
Croatia - - - 54.8 4.5 8.1 
Hungary 73.9 10.9 14.8 69.2 9.2 13.4 
Ireland 65.5 11.9 18.1 53.6 4.0 7.4 
Italy 72.4 6.9 9.6 77.3 5.6 7.3 
Lithuania 73.4 17.2 23.4 83.2 13.1 15.7 
Luxembourg - - - 51.3 4.0 7.7 
Latvia - - - 76.4 9.1 12.4 
Malta - - - 61.7 3.5 5.7 
Netherlands 74.7 11.2 15.0 64.6 4.9 7.7 
Poland 78.6 15.5 19.7 86.7 13.1 15.1 
Portugal 95.9 32.4 33.7 99.0 24.9 25.1 
Romania - - - 59.4 5.8 9.8 
Slovenia 86.9 17.3 19.9 85.3 10.4 12.2 
Slovakia - - - 93.2 15.1 16.2 
United Kingdom - - - 75.3 7.7 10.2 
Non-euro area  - - - 75.2 8.7 11.5 
Euro area  - - - 73.8 6.2 8.4 
Total - - - 74.2 6.9 9.4 
Total (WDN 2007 
countries) 
72.2 11.3 15.6 75.2 7.4 9.7 
Note: The data are weighted to reflect overall employment and are rescaled to exclude non response. The unconditional 
percentage share of non-base wage in total pay is calculated across all firms (including those not paying bonuses). The 
conditional percentage share of non-base wage in total pay is calculated only across companies that use non-base wage 
components. 
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Table A2: Use of labour cost adjustment channels 
Country 
Share of firms (%) having faced negative shocks (either strong or moderate) and having cut 
base 
wage 
non-base 
wage hours employees  
base 
wage 
non-base 
wage hours employees  
unconditional conditional on DNWR  
AT 1.5 6.1 11.1 27.6 0.0 11.4 20.9 13.2 
BE 2.1 2.9 24.2 45.5 0.7 3.3 27.1 63.4 
BG 22.2 34.1 10.7 55.7 34.2 44.2 23.4 87.6 
CY 64.8 63.4 22.0 64.9 68.5 67.4 26.0 76.4 
CZ 12.7 32.1 17.2 52.7 17.2 51.4 25.1 69.1 
DE 4.7 6.7 11.4 22.4 12.7 18.4 20.5 32.4 
EE 16.3 18.5 9.7 28.2 29.8 44.8 10.7 36.4 
ES 8.1 28.4 18.7 49.8 14.0 42.9 18.1 63.5 
FR 2.4 13.8 13.0 44.4 2.1 26.0 18.2 57.9 
GR 63.0 53.8 18.5 54.4 70.8 55.6 20.7 65.2 
HR 32.8 33.4 5.1 55.4 43.0 45.5 6.5 64.5 
HU 9.1 28.5 8.3 38.4 16.9 41.9 9.1 49.2 
IE 21.7 39.4 21.2 41.6 23.5 43.0 23.8 48.7 
IT 6.9 22.4 34.1 48.0 1.9 46.4 32.0 52.2 
LT 12.8 19.0 9.0 36.8 20.5 29.4 12.6 43.4 
LU 3.3 23.5 18.1 46.0 4.8 42.5 32.6 80.3 
LV 22.0 24.0 12.9 48.5 24.2 23.0 11.4 50.8 
MT 2.3 1.0 9.8 35.1 
    NL 15.3 35.5 17.1 71.5 26.4 49.3 13.5 82.0 
PL 7.0 11.6 4.1 33.5 16.0 32.6 0.0 49.4 
PT 11.0 25.3 14.1 49.6 13.2 32.8 18.5 66.0 
RO 10.5 20.6 10.7 52.1 12.6 33.1 15.9 70.3 
SI 19.6 35.1 14.2 55.6 36.3 63.9 21.0 70.4 
SK 5.8 20.6 15.9 45.2 10.3 35.9 35.7 49.7 
UK 4.9 14.9 11.7 38.0 8.1 14.3 18.4 45.1 
Total 7.5 18.2 16.2 42.3 13.2 30.2 19.0 55.5 
Source: WDN3, authors’ calculation. 
Note: The shocks considered are change in demand, customers’ ability to pay and access to external finance. 
The data are weighted to reflect overall employment in the country and rescaled to exclude non-response. 
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Table A3: Relationship between cuts in non-base wage components and base wage rigidity 
  Coefficients    Marginal effects  
DNWR, base wage freezes  0.534*** 0.421*** 0.411*** 0.117*** 0.086*** 0.084*** 
  (0.040) (0.038) (0.088)   (0.010) (0.008) (0.016) 
DNWR * shocks                
Base wage freezes & demand shock      -0.091       -0.019 
 
    (0.103)       (0.021) 
Base wage freezes & customer pay shock      0.188***       0.038*** 
 
    (0.053)       (0.012) 
Base wage freezes & credit shock      -0.069       -0.014 
 
    (0.063)       (0.013) 
Base wage freezes & supplies shock     -0.071*       -0.015* 
      (0.041)       (0.009) 
Shocks                
Demand shock   0.534*** 0.561***     0.109*** 0.114*** 
 
  (0.052) (0.065)     (0.013) (0.015) 
Finance shock   0.284*** 0.305***     0.058*** 0.062*** 
 
  (0.027) (0.033)     (0.007) (0.008) 
Customers’ ability to pay shocks   0.154*** 0.094**     0.032*** 0.019** 
 
  (0.042) (0.047)     (0.008) (0.009) 
Availability of supplies shocks   0.135*** 0.162***     0.028*** 0.033*** 
    (0.028) (0.035)     (0.006) (0.008) 
Sectors                
Elect gas water 0.087 0.091 0.091   0.019 0.019 0.018 
 
(0.272) (0.256) (0.256)   (0.059) (0.052) (0.052) 
Construction  0.387*** 0.261*** 0.262***   0.085*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 
 
(0.079) (0.064) (0.064)   (0.020) (0.015) (0.015) 
Trade 0.145*** 0.104*** 0.105***   0.032*** 0.021** 0.022** 
 
(0.033) (0.036) (0.037)   (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Services 0.168*** 0.177*** 0.177***   0.037*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 
 
(0.046) (0.043) (0.043)   (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Financial intermediation  0.391*** 0.361*** 0.361***   0.086*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 
  (0.109) (0.112) (0.113)   (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) 
Size               
20–49 employees  0.053 0.115*** 0.117***   0.012 0.023*** 0.024*** 
  (0.033) (0.036) (0.036)   (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
50–199 employees  0.100* 0.194*** 0.196***   0.022* 0.039*** 0.040*** 
  (0.052) (0.056) (0.056)   (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
+200 employees 0.143** 0.287*** 0.289***   0.031* 0.058*** 0.059*** 
  (0.071) (0.062) (0.063)   (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) 
Other features                
Labour cost share 0.260*** 0.182** 0.181**   0.057*** 0.037** 0.037** 
  (0.076) (0.080) (0.079)   (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
Manual workers % -0.002** -0.002*** 
-
0.002***   -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
High tenure workers (+5y) %  0.005*** 0.003*** 0.003***   0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Multi-establishment firm  0.160*** 0.143*** 0.144***   0.035*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)   (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Observations 19,234 18,582 18,582   19,234 18,582 18,582 
Note: Marginal effects reported. Probit estimation. The dependent variable is equal to one if the firm reduces non-base wage 
components. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.  
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Table A4: Relationship between non-base wage cuts and wage rigidity – the role of 
unions  
  
DNWR – Firms froze base wages  0.573*** 0.561*** 0.574*** 0.560*** 
 
(0.053) (0.049) (0.047) (0.049) 
% of workers covered by coll. agreement  0.001 0     
 
(0.001) (0.002)     
Collective agreement of any kind   0.077   0.066 
   
(0.128)   (0.045) 
Collective agreement outside of the firm -0.022       
 
(0.101)       
Collective agreement at the firm -0.019   0.046   
 
(0.047)   (0.032)   
Observations 9,288 10,194 10,172 10,277 
Note: Probit estimates. Coefficients. The dependent variable is equal to one if the firm reduces non-base wage components. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Other covariates include firm size, sector and firm 
characteristics as in Table A3. 
